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UNITED STATES FLOOD CONTROL POLICY:
THE INCOMPLETE TRANSITION FROM THE
ILLUSION OF TOTAL PROTECTION TO RISK
MANAGEMENT
A. DAN TARLOCK†
I. INTRODUCTION: FROM PASSIVE TO ACTIVE
ADAPTATION
A. The Transition From Passive Adaptation to Maximum Protection
A flood occurs when water overflows a river or a lake and covers
land that is not normally submerged. Floods are an inevitable
function of the hydrologic cycle, and flood cycles were originally seen
as blessings because they sustained riverine ecosystems and the
floodplain economies dependent on them. Floods became a social
problem only when they did not occur. However, as more people
settled in floodplains, floods transformed into a social problem
because they both disrupted agricultural production and caused
extensive damage to settlements. Floodplain dwellers soon expected
governments to reduce or prevent flood damages through hydrologic
engineering. The construction of dykes to halt the spread of flood
waters and increase the current to flush silt downstream dates back to
1
at least the eighth century CE in China. Roman-raised embankments
2
in the Fens lasted until the eighteenth century in England.
Until the mid-twentieth century, the story of modern flood
control was the transition from adaptation to the inevitable to an
expectation that government would provide maximum flood

† A.B. Stanford University, 1962, LL.B. Stanford University, 1965. Distinguished
Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law and Honorary Professor UNESCO Centre for
Water Law, Policy, and Science, University of Dundee, Scotland.
1. E.g., RANDALL A. DODGEN, CONTROLLING THE DRAGON: CONFUCIAN ENGINEERS
AND THE YELLOW RIVER IN LATE IMPERIAL CHINA 14 (2001) (explaining that efforts to
control flooding on the Yellow River using levees and canals were documented as early as the
sixth century B.C.E.).
2. JEREMY PURSEGLOVE, TAMING THE FLOOD: A HISTORY AND NATURAL HISTORY OF
RIVERS AND WETLANDS 40 (1988).
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prevention and generous post-disaster relief for floodplain dwellers.
For the last sixty years or so, the story has been the growing
recognition, especially as the understanding of climate change has
increased, that the goal of maximum protection is unobtainable
because flood damage is an inevitable risk that can only be managed,
but never totally avoided. Thus, we are now making the transition to
the idea that we must manage floodplains through a combination of
3
structural defenses, upstream storage, and land-use controls.
This transition to integrated floodplain management will be a
painful and controversial process because the expectation that we can
outsmart nature through maximum flood prevention is deeply
embedded in our thinking about floods. Three powerful and related
scientific, technological, and ideological nineteenth century
developments contributed to this expectation.
First, the science of hydrology developed rapidly in the
4
nineteenth century. The new understanding of water’s behavior,
along with the development of new engineering technologies enabling
construction of large dams, increased the options for flood control.
Second, these scientific and engineering developments reinforced the
5
belief, rooted in ancient Greece, that humans should use our
understanding of nature to improve upon her imperfect processes by
6
controlling them when they threaten to impede human activity.
3. See, e.g., ASSOCIATED PROGRAMME ON FLOOD MGMT., LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL
ASPECTS OF INTEGRATED FLOOD MANAGEMENT 11 (2006) (“Given the enormous influence of
land use on flood risks . . . it is imperative that land use planning and water allocation are
properly coordinated.”).
4. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, OPPORTUNITIES IN THE HYDROLOGIC SCIENCES 37–
45 (1991) (tracing the development of the science from the Greeks to the present day).
5. See J. DONALD HUGHES, PAN’S TRAVAIL: ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS OF THE
ANCIENT GREEKS AND ROMANS 195 (1994) (tracing the evolution of ancient civilization’s
earlier view of nature as fundamentally sacred to the later secular and self-interested view that
nature exists to serve human ends and concluding that this approach did not as much lead to
useful knowledge as it did from the Enlightenment on because natural philosophers merely
speculated but did not observe and experiment).
6. For a classic example of the belief that we can engineer our way out of natural
disasters, see Cornella Dean, Lifeline Built on Shifting Sands, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2012, at D1,
which describes the reconstruction efforts of the Highway 12 on the Outer Banks of North
Carolina. The bridge, rebuilt after Hurricane Irene, is already stressed. Id. North Carolina has
decided not to follow the example of King Canute. The Danish King of England refused to
listen to his sycophantic court who claimed that he was all powerful. Along the seashore, he
asked if he could turn back the tide and demonstrated that he could not by wading into the
water as it rose around him. See also Jonathon Claybourne, Is Sea Level Rise Dead, WASH.
DAILY NEWS, Feb. 18, 2012, http://www.wdnweb.com/2012/02/18/is-sea-level-rise-dead/
(describing the 2012 debate surrounding the North Carolina Coastal Commission proposal to
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Third, a powerful, central state gradually became accepted as the
7
entity to control nature, and thus promote human progress.
Beginning in the 1860s, these trends led to a policy of maximum
8
flood prevention. The rub is that the assumptions on which the policy
is based no longer hold in their original form. However, the United
States has not found a coherent replacement for maximum flood
protection. For example, since 2006, the federal government has spent
$14.5 billion on a post-Katrina flood protection system for New
Orleans, although the 133-mile chain of levees, flood walls, gates, and
pumps still puts the city at risk because it is based on the outmoded
9
concept of the 100-year flood.
B. The Demise of Maximum Protection
Engineers have long promised floodplain dwellers that structural
measures such as levees, dykes, and upstream storage reservoirs can
substantially prevent flood damage. Students of flood policy know
that promise to be illusory for four basic reasons. First, global climate
change has undermined many of the fundamental hydrologic
assumptions upon which flood control, from levee construction to
reservoir management, is premised. Hydrologists have long assumed
that they could predict with considerable accuracy the frequency and
10
scale of floods. Today, the underlying assumption that hydrologic
regimes are relatively “stationary” over time has been replaced with

add a requirement that county coastal plans include protection for an anticipated 39 inch sea
rise over the next 100 years, but this bad news was deleted from the current proposed plan after
protests by county officials fearing a loss of real estate development); H.R. 819, GEN.
ASSEMBLY (2012) (North Carolina legislation passed in July 2012 forbidding any mention of
projected sea level rise in any planning document until 2016, a modification of an earlier version
which contained a permanent prohibition against the inconvenient truth).
7. See, e.g., ROBERT KELLEY, BATTLING THE INLAND SEA: FLOODS, PUBLIC POLICY,
AND THE SACRAMENTO VALLEY xxi–xxii (1998) [hereinafter KELLEY, BATTLING THE INLAND
SEA] (“The decades-long struggle to get control of the Sacramento River illustrates . . . how a
society originally build almost exclusively around individualism and localism was slowly but
irresistibly pushed on to construct, out of necessity, strong regulatory central authorities. In this
sense, Battling the Inland Sea is a study in the history of American federalism.”).
8. See infra notes 33–36.
9. John Schwartz, Vast Defenses Now Shielding New Orleans Against Big Storms, N.Y.
TIMES, June 15, 2012, at A28.
10. See INTERAGENCY FLOODPLAIN MGMT. REVIEW COMM., SHARING THE
CHALLENGE: FLOODPLAIN MANAGEMENT INTO THE 21ST CENTURY 2 (1994) (discussing the
use of projections such as the 100 and 500 year flood, which are used in the design of flood
control structures).
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the climate-change-influenced assumption that they are non11
stationary.
Second, even before the current efforts to de-legitimate the
12
federal government, Congress had lost interest in funding large-scale
13
water projects, which in the eastern United States meant floodcontrol reservoirs. The federal government continues to be the major,
but not exclusive, source of levee maintenance and construction.
Nevertheless, all indications suggest that the federal government will
reduce investment in flood control, especially in dams, and instead
will shift more responsibility for flood management downward to
14
equally cash-starved state and local governments.
Third, experts (if not politicians) have recognized that not only is
maximum flood protection an impossible goal; it also has the perverse
effect of increasing flood damage by encouraging more people to
15
occupy floodplains.
Fourth, the environmental movement has created more respect
for the functions and ecosystem services that floods provide. The
argument is that, to achieve social objectives such as flood control, it
is often better social policy to work with, not against, natural riverine
16
processes.
This essay examines the evolution of United States flood policies,
the laws that have implemented them, and the current debate about
the merits of these policies and laws. It first examines the relationship
among major flood disasters, the scientific and engineering debates
about flood management that the disasters stimulated, and the
11. P.C.D. Milly et al., Stationarity is Dead: Whither Water Management?, 319 SCI. 573, 573
(2008). See generally Robin Kundis Craig, “Stationarity is Dead”—Long Live Transformation:
Five Principles for Climate Change Adaptation Law, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 9 (2010)
(providing five principles for developing environmental law in the face of climate change).
12. See generally THOMAS E. MANN & NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, IT’S EVEN WORSE THAN IT
LOOKS: HOW THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM COLLIDED WITH THE NEW POLITICS
OF EXTREMISM (2012) (giving a sobering assessment of the impact of the 2012 Congressional
election on the operation of the federal government).
13. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, NATIONAL WATER RESOURCES CHALLENGES FACING
THE U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS 2–3 (2011).
14. Id. at 17.
15. See U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, FLOOD RISK MANAGEMENT: VALUE TO THE
NATION 4 (2009) (noting that total flood prevention is impossible). National flood damages
averaged around $3.9 billion per year in 1980s and nearly doubled from 1995 to 2004, and total
disaster assistance for both emergency response operations and subsequent long-term recovery
efforts increased from an average of $444 million during the 1980s to $3.75 billion during the
1995-2004 decade. Id.
16. PURSEGLOVE, supra note 2, at 149.
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policies and legal institutions that emerged post-disaster. It next
examines the current criticisms of our flood management policies and
the laws that reflect these policies. It concludes with a discussion of
the European Union’s 2007 Floods Directive as an example of a
coherent risk-management policy for floods, and identifies three
barriers to adopting and implementing such a policy in the United
States. These are (1) the lack of a coherent flood-management vision,
(2) the fragmentation of federal spending and its impact on local
government flood-control programs, and (3) the chilling impact of the
Supreme Court’s takings jurisprudence.
II. FIVE BASIC WAYS TO COPE WITH FLOODS
Flood-protection policy is a product of four factors: a devastating
flood, the state of flood-mitigation knowledge, available technological
options, and the political priorities of the time. Flood-protection
policy has evolved through five overlapping stages: passive
adaptation, channel control, upstream water retention, floodplain
management, and integrated flood-risk management. All have been
attempted, and all are in place around the country.
A. Passively Adapt to Flood Cycles
Humans have long accepted floods as inevitable and have
passively adapted to them. Adaptation is a continuum of strategies
which range from mere retreat to the use of low-level technologies to
take advantage of the inevitable flood or to avoid the damages.
The Nile River in ancient Egypt is the classic example of
adaptation through using minimal technology to harness the benefits
of floods. Civilization was only possible in a narrow fertile band along
17
the River and depended “on the life-giving waters of the Nile.”
Because the River’s annual floods created embankments along the
river and the valley was convex, it was possible to build an intricate
system of gravity canals and regulators to distribute the water and
nutrient-laden silt to irrigate the grains, vegetables, and flax that
18
sustained the kingdom.

17. TOBY WILKINSON, THE RISE AND FALL OF ANCIENT EGYPT 29 (2010).
18. ROBERT O. COLLINS, THE NILE 132–33 (2002). The use of technology did not
accelerate until the late 19th century after the British drove out the last Turkish Pasha in 1882.
See id. at 141–76. They quickly developed a basin wide flood management program which
included dams, flood control lakes and diversion canals. See id.
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Native Americans also dealt with floods by quick adaptation.
Before the French founded New Orleans, the local hunter–gatherer
Indian tribes that lived in the region simply retreated to higher
19
ground when the Mississippi River flooded. However, the United
States government did not learn from them and has instead tried to
20
prevent the maximum amount of flood damage. Once a substantial
human settlement is established, retreat is not an option and societies
turn to damage-prevention technology. Still, the inevitability of floods
can be integrated into the expectations of residents. For example,
consider Davenport, Iowa. The city is built on a narrow floodplain
and steep hills along the Mississippi and the adjoining bluffs to the
west. Its neighbor across the river, Moline, Illinois, has levees along
its banks, but there are none in Davenport. Instead, Davenport deals
with floods by warnings, by preserving open space adjacent to the
river, by building temporary dykes, and, of course, by concentrating
21
dwellings on the hills.
Adaptation can be cheap, but it is always a risky political strategy
for government. Ancient Egypt’s prosperity and thus political
stability depended on the annual flood cycle, and her rulers identified
the relation between the natural order of the Nile and political
22
order. A low flood year could undermine political stability and, over
23
time, create pressures for more sophisticated technological control.
A series of low flood years may have speeded Egypt’s fall to the
24
Roman Empire during Cleopatra’s reign (52–30 BCE). The ensuing
famine was seen as a sign that the Gods had deserted her, “a
19. In the 16th century, Spanish explorers of the Mississippi observed that the Indians built
their houses on high land and, in low areas, built mounds to live on during floods. CHAMP
CLARK, FLOOD 65–87 (1982); see also LAWRENCE N. POWELL, THE ACCIDENTAL CITY:
IMPROVISING NEW ORLEANS 7 (2012); Tristram R. Kidder, Making the City Inevitable: Native
Americans and the Geography of New Orleans, in TRANSFORMING NEW ORLEANS AND ITS
ENVIRONS: CENTURIES OF CHANGE 9, 11 (Craig E. Colten, ed. 2000).
20. See generally George S. Pabis, Subduing Nature through Engineering: Caleb G. Forshey
and the Levees-only Policy, 1851-1881, in TRANSFORMING NEW ORLEANS, supra note 19, at 64
(detailing the development of a total flood control policy during the middle of the nineteenth
century).
21. See DAVENPORT, IOWA, CODE § 15.44 (2000) (restricting development within the
Mississippi River and tributary creek floodplains and requiring the elevation of residential
structures and the flood proofing of commercial buildings located in the floodplain areas).
22. WILKINSON, supra note 17, at 27–30.
23. COLLINS, supra note 18, at 18, 130.
24. See WILKINSON, supra note 17, at 496; cf. DODGEN, supra note 1, at 3 (explaining that
Classical Chinese history attributed the fall of a dynasty with the loss of the mandate of heaven,
a major symptom of which was “the inability to control the Yellow River”).
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25

profoundly worrying development.” The lessons were repeated in
26
China, where flood control was central to the emperor’s legitimacy.
In the United States, the failure of the federal government to prevent
and ameliorate the negative consequences of the disastrous 1927
Mississippi Delta Flood pried African-Americans away from the
Republican Party of Lincoln and helped to create the New Deal
27
coalition that sustained the Democratic Party from 1932 to 1952.
B. Confine the River to Its Bed and Manipulate It
Permanent human settlement precludes retreat as a strategy, and
therefore produces demand for levee construction and channel
alteration. Levees are the oldest type of human intervention with
28
hydrologic regimes. Soon after its founding in 1717, New Orleans
29
built its first levee. Long before New Orleans, the Chinese realized
that they needed to control upstream flood dynamics because siltladen runoff raised riverbeds and increased the spread of
30
floodwaters. In the United States, farmers in the Sacramento Valley
linked the severity of floods in part to the flushing of hydraulic mining
waste into Sacramento’s tributaries, which raised the riverbed and
31
caused frequent winter floods.
Levees and channel alteration emerged as the flood-protection
strategy of choice after the Civil War, when Congress assigned to the
United States Army Corps of Engineers lead responsibility for
protecting land along the Mississippi River (alongside its primary
32
mission of navigation enhancement). Rival engineers advocated
competing theories of how to control flooding by moving water as

25. WILKINSON, supra note 17, at 496.
26. DODGEN, supra note 1, at 3.
27. See JOHN M. BARRY, RISING TIDE: THE GREAT MISSISSIPPI FLOOD OF 1927 AND
HOW IT CHANGED AMERICA 412–15 (1997) (discussing the social, cultural, and economic
impact of the Mississippi flood of 1927 on the African-American community).
28. Larry W. Mays, Irrigation Systems, Ancient, WATER ENCYCLOPEDIA: SCI. & ISSUES,
http://www.waterencyclopedia.com/Hy-La/Irrigation-Systems-Ancient.html (last visited Nov. 18,
2012).
29. Christopher Morris, Impenetrable but Easy: The French Transformation of the Lower
Mississippi Valley and the Founding of New Orleans, in TRANSFORMING NEW ORLEANS, supra
note 19, at 22, 34; see also POWELL, supra note 19.
30. DODGEN, supra note 1, at 13.
31. ROBERT KELLEY, GOLD VS. GRAIN: THE HYDRAULIC MINING CONTROVERSY IN
CALIFORNIA’S SACRAMENTO VALLEY 57 (1959).
32. Christine A. Klien & Sandra B. Zellmer, Mississippi River Stories: Lessons from a
Century of Unnatural Disasters, 60 SMU L. REV. 1471, 1478–80 (2007).
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33

quickly as possible into the Gulf of Mexico. Andrew Humphreys,
Chief Engineer of the Corps, argued that levees alone were the best
strategy because they would accelerate the current and deepen the
34
river channel. Humphreys’s rival, the brilliant engineer James Eads,
convinced the Corps that the same result could be more effectively
35
achieved by constructing jetties at the mouth of the River.
Political ideology also impeded flood-control policy. The Corps
did construct some navigation-improvement levees along the
Mississippi and other large rivers. However, in the nineteenth
century, Jeffersonian ideology ensured that flood control was a local,
36
or at best, a state function, even though rivers such as the Mississippi
37
spanned many states. Today, the United States still has no unified
levee system; there are over 100,000 miles of levees in various states
of repair and deterioration in the United States, and eighty-five
38
percent are locally owned.
The levees-only policy could not prevent flood damage in part
39
because coverage was fragmented.
The Mississippi River
Commission tried to coordinate levee construction through its
standard-setting policy, but the weaknesses of that approach became
40
increasingly apparent over time. Congress took a first step toward
federal responsibility for flood prevention by passing the Flood
41
Control Act of 1917. The Act authorized levee construction, but
only on the condition that the levees would be turned over to local
42
interests for maintenance. It took the 1927 Mississippi River Flood
to fundamentally change United States policy.

33. See Richard G. Weingardt, James Buchanan Eads, 5 LEADERSHIP & MGMT.
ENGINEERING 70, 73 (2005).
34. Klien & Zellmer, supra note 32, at 1479.
35. Weingardt, supra note 33, at 73–74.
36. See, e.g., KELLEY, BATTLING THE INLAND SEA, supra note 7, at 31–32 (telling the story
of the increasing centralization and scale of flood control in California’s Sacramento River
Valley).
37. The Mississippi River Commission was formed in 1879 and adopted a policy of
coordinated levee construction in 1882. MISS. RIVER COMM’N, THE MISSISSIPPI RIVER &
TRIBUTARIES PROJECT: HISTORY OF LOWER MISSISSIPPI RIVER LEVEE SYSTEM 5–6 (2007).
38. Am. Soc’y of Civil Eng’rs, Levees, REPORT CARD FOR AMERICA’S INFRASTRUCTURE,
http://www.infrastructurereportcard.org/fact-sheet/levees (last visited Sept. 22, 2012).
39. See Klein & Zellmer, supra note 32, at 1482–83.
40. See U.S. WATER RES. POLICY COMM’N. WATER RESOURCES LAW 128–29 (1950).
41. Flood Control Act of 1917, ch. 144, 39 Stat. 948 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§
701–703 (2006)).
42. Id. § 1(d).
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Students of environmental law have demonstrated how major
disasters, such as floods or persistent air pollution, have contributed
43
to the development of new public-policy responses and laws. Among
other events in the late 1920s, the 1927 Mississippi Flood illustrates
this thesis. In brief, extraordinarily heavy rains in the MissouriMississippi valleys from August 1926 to April 1927 caused levee
44
failures from Missouri to Louisiana in April 1927. “The 1927 Great
Mississippi Flood inundated 27,000 square miles (70,000 square
kilometers) of land with as much as 30 feet (9 meters) of water. It
took until mid-August for all of the water to recede, leaving a mud45
covered, barren landscape.”
Congress responded to the 1927 flood by enacting the Flood
46
Control Act of 1928, which had five major consequences for United
States flood control policy that continue to the present. First, the 1928
Act cemented federal responsibility for flood control by making it a
47
Corps mission of equal if not greater importance than navigation.

43. See, e.g., JAMES E. KRIER & EDMUND URSIN, POLLUTION & POLICY: A CASE ESSAY
CALIFORNIA AND FEDERAL EXPERIENCE WITH MOTOR VEHICLE AIR POLLUTION, 1940–
1975, at 263–77 (1977) (using the history of the Los Angeles pollution crises to explain the role
episodic crises play in policymaking).
44. BARRY, supra note 27, at 194–201.
45. RISK MGMT. SOLUTIONS, THE 1927 GREAT MISSISSIPPI FLOOD: 80-YEAR
RETROSPECTIVE
7
(2007),
available
at
http://www.rms.com/publications/1927_
MississippiFlood.pdf. The social impacts of the flood were as important as the physical ones.
African-Americans were forced to reinforce levees—many of the breaches flooded lands on
which they lived—and neither the federal nor state governments provided significant relief.
BARRY, supra note 27, at 314–17, 371. The inadequate federal response triggered the Great
Migration north, and pried African-Americans from the Republican Party, see id. at 414–16.
46. Flood Control Act of 1928, ch. 569, 45 Stat. 534 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§
702a–702m, 704 (2006)). Section 2 of the Act stated the following:
[I]n view of the extent of national concern in the control of these floods in the
interests of national prosperity, the flow of interstate commerce, and the
movement of the United States mails; and, in view of the gigantic scale of the
project, involving flood waters of a volume and flowing from a drainage area
largely outside the States most affected, and far exceeding those of any other
river in the United States, no local contribution to the project herein adopted
is required.
Id. § 2. However, Congress did not expressly endorse federal responsibility for flood control
nationwide until 1936. Klein & Zellmer, supra note 32, at 1485; see also infra notes 61–64 and
accompanying text.
47. See, e.g., Flood Control Act of 1928 § 1 (placing the flood control project under the
supervision of the Army Corp of Engineers). The 1928 Act was an immediate response to the
flood and forced the Corps to recant its longstanding opposition to the Progressive
Conservation idea of basin-wide multiple purpose water projects. Klein & Zellmer, supra note
32, at 1484–85. The Act itself continued the levees-only policy but took a major step toward
federal responsibility for comprehensive river-basin management by authorizing $325 million to
ON
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Second, the 1928 Act laid the foundation for the demise of the leveesonly approach, with a transition to the construction of upstream
reservoirs. Third, the 1928 Act formally committed the Corps to the
Progressive Conservation Era vision of a river-basin-wide approach
48
to water management. For the first time, the Corps was directed to
include “the establishment of a reservoir system” in its basin-wide
49
planning for the Mississippi. Fourth, the 1928 Act enshrined as the
dominant flood-management paradigm structural defense through
50
dams and levees, supplemented by dedicated flood ways. Fifth, the
1928 Act’s commitment to structural defense created the seeds of its
partial demise as flood damages continued to rise, eventually
triggering the debate between the merits of taming, as opposed to
working with, nature. This debate currently dominates flood control
policy.
C. Retain Flood Waters in Large Reservoirs
Levees remain a popular flood-control strategy. Their physical
bulk gives the impression that building behind them is safe. But this is
51
an illusion. Levees fail in various ways. To complement this strategy,
flood-control policymakers pursued the dream of maximum damage

construct levees and outlets on land subject to flood easements. See Flood Control Act of 1928 §
1.
48. See Flood Control Act of 1928 § 1 (authorizing “the project for the flood control of the
Mississippi River in its alluvial valley”); see also ARTHUR E. MORGAN, DAMS AND OTHER
DISASTERS: A CENTURY OF THE ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS IN CIVIL WORKS 300–02 (1971)
(criticizing the Corps, the author’s long time antagonist).
49. 33 U.S.C. § 702j (2006). The roots of the legislation go back to a 1925 act, Act of Mar.
3, 1925, 43 Stat. 1186 (1925), which mandated joint Federal Power Commission and Corps
studies of the feasibility of power development on navigable streams. The resulting 308 studies,
H.R. Doc. No. 69-308 (1927), laid the foundation for the subsequent expansion of Corps
planning responsibility and mission expansion. For Corps planning mandates from 1925 to 1944,
see U.S. WATER RES. POLICY COMM’N, supra note 40, at 408–17.
50. 33 U.S.C. § 702c (reinforcing the maximum structural protection strategy by
immunizing the federal government from any liability for “damage from floods or flood waters
at any place”). But see Cent. Green Co. v. United States, 531 U.S. 425, 436–437 (2001) (creating
an exception for non-flood waters running in a federal flood control project); In re Katrina
Canal Breaches Consolidated Litigation, 696 F.3d 436, 446–48 (5th Cir. 2012) (refusing to apply
§ 702c’s immunity to the negligent construction of a navigation channel, the Missisippi River
Gulf Outlet, that carried the storm surge from Hurricane Katrina into New Orleans, although
ultimately finding immunity under the discretionary-function exception of the Federal Tort
Claims Act).
51. See Evan Lehmann & ClimateWire, When the Levee Breaks: U.S. Flood Protection
Inadequate, SCI. AM. (Jan. 18, 2012), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=us-floodprotection-inadequate-levee-breaks.

Tarlock 12.17 (Do Not Delete)

Fall 2012]

12/17/2012 2:27 PM

U.S. FLOOD CONTROL POLICY

161

elimination through dams and reservoirs throughout most of the
twentieth century. Flood-control dams date from the third or second
52
millennium BCE, but they did not come into widespread use until
the nineteenth century in Europe.
In the United States, the modern flood-control dam is the legacy
of Arthur Morgan, the visionary engineer widely credited as the first
proponent of a strategy of water-retention. In response to a disastrous
53
1913 flood in Dayton, Ohio, Morgan convinced the city to build
54
upstream flood-control storage reservoirs on the Miami River. His
solution for the Miami Conservacy District became the template for
federal policy when it was adopted by the United States Congress in
55
the 1928 Act. The Miami model launched Morgan’s career; from
1933 to 1938, he was the chairman of the Tennessee Valley Authority,
and the dams and reservoirs that are part of the Lower Mississippi
56
flood-control system are his most concrete legacy.
Into the 1920s, the Corps was still under the spell of its leveesonly policy and opposed dams even as its new rival, the Bureau of
Reclamation, was building multiple-purpose dams, primarily for
57
irrigation and hydroelectric power production. But Congress
dragged the Corps into dam building. Starting in 1925, Congress
required that the Federal Power Commission and the Corps prepare
river-basin plans for the “improvement” of streams for navigation,

52. See ROBERT B. JANSEN, BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR,
DAMS AND PUBLIC SAFETY 1–2 (1983), available at http://ussdams.com/ussdeducation/
Media/damsfrombegin.doc (discussing the early history of dams, especially dam projects on the
Nile River).
53. The flood is well documented. For a list of links to information about the flood and to
personal accounts, see The Great Dayton Flood of 1913, DAYTON HISTORY BOOKS ONLINE,
http://www.daytonhistorybooks.com/page/page/1566099.htm (last visited Sept. 20, 2012).
54. J. David Rodgers, The 1913 Dayton Flood and the Birth of Modern Flood Control
Engineering in the United States (unpublished PowerPoint presentation), available at
http://web.mst.edu/~rogersda/umrcourses/ge301/Dayton%20Flood-Updated.pdf.
55. See 33 U.S.C. § 702j. It is difficult to trace Morgan’s influence directly. He claimed
paternity for Corps of Engineers flood control dams. MORGAN, supra note 48, at 302; LELAND
R. JOHNSON, THE FALLS CITY ENGINEERS: A HISTORY OF THE LOUISVILLE DISTRICT, CORPS
ENGINEERS,
UNITED
STATES
ARMY
195–96
(1974),
available
at
OF
http://publications.usace.army.mil/publications/misc/un22/c-12.pdf, provides more objective
evidence that Corps engineers who studied the Miami Valley dams incorporated the success of
dams into their thinking, which in turn influenced Congress.
56. MORGAN, supra note 48, at 344.
57. See SAMUEL P. HAYS, CONSERVATION AND THE GOSPEL OF EFFICIENCY: THE
PROGRESSIVE CONSERVATION MOVEMENT, 1890–1920, at 208–11 (1959) (explaining the
hostilities of the Corps towards dam construction).
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hydroelectric power, irrigation, and flood control. These “308
Reports,” named after the document number for the first report, were
59
submitted to Congress in 1926, and the 1928 Act required that a 308
Report for the Mississippi be prepared that included, inter alia, a
determination of whether additional flood control could be “attained
through the control of flood waters in the drainage basins of the
60
tributaries by the establishment of a reservoir system.”
The floodwater-retention strategy was enshrined in United
States law and policy during the Great Depression and the aftermath
of World War II. During his four terms, President Franklin Roosevelt
first embraced dams as engines of employment to combat
skyrocketing joblessness during the Depression, and after the Allied
victory became certain, saw them as sources of employment for
61
returning veterans. Congress agreed and enacted two New Deal
Congressional acts committing the United States to multiple-purpose
dams where flood control was a primary purpose. The Flood Control
62
Act of 1936 declared that flood control on navigable rivers and their
tributaries was a “proper activity of the Federal Government in
63
cooperation with States, their political subdivisions and localities.”
In an attempt to rationalize federal spending, it also introduced
64
benefit–cost analysis as the standard for project construction.
The Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), created under the
Tennessee Valley Authority Act of 1933, was the first to put
floodwater retention into large-scale practice. During World War II,
an effort was made to apply the lessons of the TVA to the Missouri

58. Act of Mar. 3, 1925, ch. 467, § 3, 43 Stat. 1186, 1190.
59. See H.R. Doc. No. 69-308 (1926).
60. 33 U.S.C. § 702j.
61. JOHN R. FERRELL, BIG DAM ERA: A LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF
THE PICK-SLOAN MISSOURI BASIN PROGRAM 2–3 (1993) (quoting the statement of Franklin D.
Roosevelt’s Secretary of the Interior, Harold L. Ickes, to the National Reclamation Association
in 1943 “that the Bureau of Reclamation was prepared to neutralize demobilization’s negative
effect on the West”).
62. Flood Control Act of 1936, Pub. L. No. 74-738, 49 Stat. 1572.
63. Id.
64. United States v. W. Va. Power Co., 122 F.2d 733, 736–37 (4th Cir. 1941). Although the
Corps and the Office of Management and Budget are committed to formal benefit-cost analysis,
Congress is not bound by good practice and has unlimited discretion to decide whether a project
it chooses to approve meets the statutory standard.
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River. By the 1940s, the rural population of the Missouri River
66
watershed was declining. Urban areas were growing, and Omaha
67
and other upstream cities experienced serious flooding in 1943.
These floods led to pressure for a quick, federal, and structural
68
solution. Within a short time, the Missouri River Division Corps
Engineer, General Lewis A. Pick, proposed a flood-control plan that
relied on the construction of five mainstream reservoirs on the
Missouri from North Dakota to the northeastern border of
69
Nebraska. William Sloan, of the Bureau of Reclamation, prepared a
competing plan that was more favorable to upstream irrigation
interests. Congress combined the plans, and funded the new Pick–
70
Sloan Plan in 1944. The five authorized dams were completed by the
71
early 1960s. Other flood-control dams followed in the 1950s and
72
1960s. Nationwide, the Corps currently owns over 600 flood-control
73
dams on both large and small rivers.
Ironically, these two New Deal programs made it impossible for
the federal government to manage river basins, contributing to the
fragmentation that characterizes current United States watermanagement policy. President Roosevelt hoped to first apply the
TVA regional-authority model to the Missouri and then to the world,
but the Basin states and Congress blocked any efforts to “TVA-ize”

65. See DAVID P. BILLINGTON, DONALD C. JACKSON & MARTIN V. MELOSI, THE
HISTORY OF LARGE FEDERAL DAMS: PLANNING, DESIGN, AND CONSTRUCTION IN THE ERA
OF BIG DAMS 269–99 (2005).
66. FERRELL, supra note 61, at 2.
67. Id. at 8.
68. Historic Floods on the Missouri River, NEB. DEP’T OF NAT. RES.,
http://www.dnr.ne.gov/floodplain/mitigation/mofloods.html (last visited Sept. 22, 2012).
69. FERRELL, supra note 61, at 50–51. An earlier dam, Fort Peck, was constructed in the
1930s by the Works Progress Administration and was incorporated into the Pick-Sloan Plan in
1944. Id.
70. See id. at 39–68 (providing a history of the quick of resolution of the two plans, one
focused on irrigation, and the other on flood control).
71. BILLINGTON ET AL., supra note 65, at 288. The dams have prevented considerable
downstream flooding, but flooding on the Missouri and Mississippi continues. See infra notes
87–88. The controversies surrounding the allocation and management of the Missouri are
beyond the scope of this paper.
72. For example, thirty-seven flood control dams were built in West Virginia between 1938
and 1988. Flood Control, W. VA. ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://www.wvencyclopedia.org/articles/2196
(last visited Sept. 22, 2012).
73. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 13, at 8.
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the Missouri in the 1944 legislation. Administrative support for a
Missouri Basin Authority died with President Roosevelt in 1944.
The dream of comprehensive, federal river-basin development
lived on until the 1970s. After the New Deal, federal support for large
75
dam construction continued but only on a project-by-project basis.
The Eisenhower Administration (1952–1960) followed a “no-new
starts” water-resources-development policy, and stressed increased
76
local responsibility for smaller projects. This policy was reversed in
the Kennedy and Johnson administrations (1960–1968); new Corps
77
dams were built in the 1960s in the Southeast and Midwest.
78
President Johnson was a committed dam builder, and he tried to
revive New Deal-style river-basin planning. The Water Resources
79
Planning Act of 1965 created seven river-basin commissions
coordinated by a federal Water Resources Council.
The attempted revival was too late. Congress was funding fewer
dams, levees, and canals, leaving these commissions with no clearly80
defined role. Water planning had historically meant water-project
planning, and it was impossible to adjust this model to basin
81
management. The National Water Commission, which operated
between 1968 and 1973, identified many of the problems of trying to
adapt a construction model to the changing water demands with
82
which the Corps was struggling. The Commission accurately noted
that “[t]he Corps . . . is not likely to exist as any agency specializing in
the construction of great engineering works; it seems virtually certain
that in the future the United States will need relatively few major

74. FERRELL, supra note 61, at 74–86.
75. STEVEN SOLOMON, WATER: THE EPIC STRUGGLE FOR WEALTH, POWER, AND
CIVILIZATION 343 (2010).
76. MARC REISNER, CADILLAC DESERT: THE AMERICAN WEST AND ITS DISAPPEARING
WATER 280 (1986).
77. Id. at 283.
78. ROBERT A. CARO, THE PATH TO POWER (1990).
79. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1962 to 1962d-3 (2006).
80. See SOLOMON, supra note 75, at 249 (“America’s age of great dams drew to a close
during the 1970s. By then, virtually all the best large dam sites had been exploited.”). For the
best account of President Jimmy Carter’s role in bringing the Big Dam Era to a close, see
REISNER, supra note 76.
81. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS WATER
RESOURCES PLANNING: A NEW OPPORTUNITY FOR SERVICE 36–41 (2004) (tracing the
evolution of water resources planning from project to environmental restoration and risk-based
planning).
82. NAT’L WATER COMM’N, WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE 366 (1973).
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83

navigation, flood control, or water projects.” The Commission was
especially critical of the lack of focus and coordination in federal
water-resources planning, which could be essentially characterized as
84
planning for planning’s sake.

D. Manage Floodplains
Dams and levees do prevent significant flood damage, but suffer
from two major limitations. First, flood damage can never be totally
prevented; it can only be minimized. The Mississippi River illustrates
this first problem: its middle and lower sections “are not impounded
85
by any main-channel dams.” These dams are insufficient to prevent
flood events, especially in the Upper Basin, such as those that
86
87
occurred in 1993 and 2011. Similar examples can be found all over
88
the country.

83. Id. at 412.
84. Id. Congress does sometimes mandate a basin-wide approach. For example, in an
omnibus act passed in 2009, Congress directed the Secretary of the Interior to assess specific
risks to the water supply of each major reclamation river basin, analyze the extent to which
changes in the water supply of the United States will impact meeting the needs of the basin
resources, and consider and develop appropriate strategies to mitigate each impact of water
supply changes. Omnibus Public Land Management Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-11, §§ 9501–
08, 123 Stat. 991, 1329–46 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 10361–68 (Supp. III 2009)).
“Major reclamation river basins” are defined to include the Columbia, Colorado, Missouri, and
Sacramento/San Joaquin river basins. Id. § 9502(12)(B), 123 Stat. at 1331.
85. JASON S. ALEXANDER, RICHARC C. WILSON & W. REED GREEN, U.S. GEOLOGICAL
SURVEY, A BRIEF HISTORY AND SUMMARY OF THE EFFECTS OF RIVER ENGINEERING AND
DAMS ON THE MISSISSIPPI RIVER SYSTEM AND DELTA 11 (2012), available at
http://pubs.usgs.gov/circ/1375/C1375.pdf. “However, all of [the middle and lower sections] major
tributaries have impoundments.” Id.
86. See generally THE GREAT FLOOD OF 1993: CAUSES, IMPACTS, AND RESPONSES
(Stanley A. Changnon ed., 1996) (describing a major flood that occurred in 1993 on the Upper
Mississippi River and Missouri River Basins); Woltemade, supra note 85 (stating the 1993 flood
caused $12 billion in damages).
87. See 2011 Mississippi River Floods, WIKIPEDIA.ORG, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
2011_Mississippi_River_floods (last visited Sept. 23, 2012) (describing major flooding on the
Mississippi River in 2011).
88. See, e.g., Flood Control, supra note 72 (“Despite flood-control efforts, West Virginia
remains prone to damaging floods. A flood on April 5, 1977, along the Tug Fork of the Big
Sandy River saw 11 counties declared major disaster areas. In November 1985, record flooding
in central and eastern West Virginia, especially in the headstream areas of the Greenbrier,
Potomac, Monongahela and Little Kanawha rivers, resulted in 47 deaths and hundreds of
millions of dollars in property damage. Occasionally, floods strike even in watersheds protected
by dams, as was the case in the Little Kanawha Valley downstream of the Burnsville Dam in
1985 and 1994.”).
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Second, structural solutions have perverse effects: floodplain
protection encourages settlement, so that when a flood occurs, the
damage often exceeds that which would have been expected prior to
dam construction. This is a classic moral-hazard problem. Moral
hazard refers to socially undesirable, often inefficient, behavior that is
encouraged by the expectation that there will not be punishment;
89
rather, there may often be rewards. The concept originated with
insurance-company efforts, such as deductibles, designed to induce
beneficiaries to refrain from activities that would trigger liability
90
under a policy.
Today, the need to adjust to the inevitability of floods is accepted
by all students of flood policy and is partially reflected in federal
91
flood-control law and policy. But the structural-defense paradigm
remains firmly entrenched because of the strong expectations of
safety and security it has engendered. Thus, adjustment is often
fiercely resisted because it means limiting floodplain development
and shifting responsibility to individual landowners to take avoidance
92
actions. The rise of the adjustment or floodplain-management
paradigm is the legacy of the late geographer Gilbert White, one of
the great students of water and disaster policy in the twentieth
century. White’s seminal 1942 University of Chicago thesis, Human
93
Adjustment to Floods, remains the bible of modern flood-control
thinking. “Few publications can claim to have transcended the
original field in which they were written, by shaping a wide range of
94
research areas and philosophies.” White pioneered the argument
that structural flood defense creates a classic moral-hazard problem
because government’s expectation that dams and levees would
protect floodplains leads them to encourage floodplain
95
development. When the inevitable flood comes, property losses and
89. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 136–37 (8th ed. 2011).
90. Id.
91. WORLD METEOROLOGICAL ORG., THE ROLE OF LAND-USE PLANNING IN FLOOD
MANAGEMENT: A TOOL FOR INTEGRATED FLOOD MANAGEMENT 22 (2007).
92. In flood control management, “one of the key considerations would be how much land
is required to pursue a local development agenda and how much of it is located in hazardous
areas. This usually limits the choices considerably.” Id.
93. GILBERT FOWLER WHITE, HUMAN ADJUSTMENT TO FLOODS: A GEOGRAPHICAL
APPROACH TO THE FLOOD PROBLEM IN THE UNITED STATES (1945).
94. N. Macdonald et al., The Significance of Gilbert White’s 1945 Paper “Human
Adjustment to Floods” in the Development of Risk and Hazard Management, 36 PROGRESS
PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY 125, 125 (2012).
95. See id. at 127.
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other damage increase—the opposite outcome of the justification for
structural defense.
White’s thinking is now the conventional wisdom when
examining flood-protection initiatives. For example, in criticizing the
California Central Valley Flood Protection Plan—California’s
ambitious attempt to address flooding at a large geographic scale—
two academics argued that the failure of the plan to impose limits on
growth was a classic example of the problems White identified:
Increasing protection levels actually increases risk where it induces
urbanization and increases the valuable life and property exposed
in areas that would otherwise remain undeveloped. That levees
induce urban development where it was formerly discouraged by
nuisance flooding is well documented. The effect is accepted by
scientists and policy analysts, going back to the pioneering work of
96
Gilbert White (1945) . . . .

Adjustment is not just an academic theory. White’s thinking
97
formed the basis of the 1968 National Flood Insurance Program. The
federal government became involved in flood insurance because
private insurance policies do not cover flood (as opposed to wind)
98
damage. Efforts to provide federal insurance date back to 1956, but
accelerated when Lyndon Johnson’s Administration created task
99
forces to recommend a national flood-insurance program. The
ensuing legislation reflected an appreciation of White’s moral-hazard
analysis, but did not fully implement it. The Bureau of the Budget’s
task force recommended that Congress first enact an experimental
100
program to evaluate its effectiveness at actually preventing damage.
However, in the last burst of faith in government before the Vietnam
96. Letter from G. Mathias Kondolf, Professor & Chair, Dep’t of Landscape Architecture
& Envtl. Planning, Univ. of Cal. Berkeley, & Jessica Ludy, Fulbright Fellow, Delft Univ. of
Tech., Neth., to Cent. Valley Flood Prot. Bd. (Apr. 20, 2012), available at
http://thewateraway.wordpress.com/2012/04/24/a-closer-look-at-the-cvfpp-1-does-increasingprotection-increase-risk/. See generally Central Valley Flood Protection Plan, CENT. VALLEY
FLOOD PROT. BD., http://www.cvfpb.ca.gov/CVFPP/ (last modified Aug. 29, 2012) (providing
information on the plan as approved in 2012).
97. Press Release, Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, FEMA Leaders’ Statements on the
Passing of Gilbert F. White (Oct. 6, 2006), available at http://www.fema.gov/news-release/femaleaders-statements-passing-gilbert-f-white; see A Chronology of Major Events Effecting the
Federal Flood Insurance Program, NAT’L INST. FOR RESEARCH, http://biotech.law.lsu.edu/
blaw/FEMA/nfip_eval_chronology.pdf.
98. Facts
About
Flood
Insurance,
FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY,
http://www.fema.gov/pdf/about/divisions/disaster_ops/flood_fs.pdf (last visited Sept. 19, 2012).
99. See generally H.R. DOC. NO. 89-465 (1966) (evaluating the benefits of a national flood
protection plan).
100. Id. at 39.
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War, Watergate, and the rise of the right, Congress enacted a national
insurance program.
101
The core elements of the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968
are the mapping of 100-year floods, the adoption of local floodmanagement programs that limit construction in 100-year floodplains,
and the requirement that landowners in the hazard areas purchase
102
flood insurance to qualify for a loan. The program provides
subsidized rates for buildings constructed before 1974, the year Flood
103
Insurance Rate Maps (FIRMs) were prepared.
Post-FIRM
104
buildings must pay full actuarial rates.
The federal flood-insurance program was flawed from the start,
and its problems have progressively worsened. In combination with
the construction of flood-control projects, a federal flood-insurance
105
program encourages over-building in high-risk areas. Writing on the
twenty-fifth anniversary of the program, Gilbert White and the
equally distinguished disaster-risk expert Howard C. Kunreuther
noted that flood damages continued to increase due to several factors.
First, although nine to eleven million people lived in floodplains, only
106
2.5 million insurance policies were in force. This coverage gap
occurred both because many real-estate agents failed to disclose when
structures were located in a floodplain, and because banks were lax in
107
enforcing the mandatory insurance requirement for mortgages.
Second, a large number of grandfathered structures suffered repeated
108
losses but were not relocated. Third, in the past decade, the federal
flood-insurance program has been on life support, living on
temporary extensions that have allowed politicians to avoid hard

101. National Flood Insurance Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-448, 82 Stat. 572 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4001–4127 (2006)).
102. 42 U.S.C. § 4012(a) (2006).
103. Id. § 4015(b).
104. Id. § 4015(c).
105. See Erwann O. Michel-Kerjan, Catastrophe Economics: The National Flood Insurance
Program, J. ECON. PERSP., Fall 2010, at 165, 179 (“Many residents living in hazard-prone areas
not only lack interest in purchasing natural hazard insurance and keeping it, they also rarely
undertake voluntary loss prevention measures to protect their property.”); see also Valdis Wish,
Can
Insurers
Cope
with
Climate
Change?,
ALLIANZ
(Oct.
16,
2009),
http://www.knowledge.allianz.com/search.cfm?98/can-insurers-cope-with-climate-change.
106. Howard C. Kunreuther & Gilbert F, White, The Role of the National Flood Insurance
Program in Reducing Losses and Promoting Wise Use of Floodplains, WATER RESOURCES
UPDATE, Spring 1994, at 31, 32.
107. Id. at 32–33.
108. Id. at 32.
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reform questions. The costs of the 2005 hurricane season, which were
primarily due to Hurricane Katrina, added eighteen billion dollars of
109
debt to the program, even though it was already running in the red.
In July 2012, Congress responded to a strong push by the real-estate
110
industry and extended the program. The National Flood Insurance
Extension Act basically leaves the program intact, with minor
improvements, but does raise the cap on premium increases for
secondary and vacation homes from ten percent to twenty-five
111
percent.
The 1968 Act pressures cities to develop flood-control plans with
a mix of structural and non-structural solutions to further stretch the
available local, state, and federal money. Cedar Rapids, Iowa is an
example of this strategy. In 2008, the city suffered six billion dollars in
112
damages when the Cedar River overflowed its banks. The city
responded by creating a flood-management plan to increase the span
of floodwalls around the downtown area, but also to develop a
113
greenway across the river to spread the flood waters. The plan
raises a classic environmental-justice issue since lower-income
residences are often built in unprotected floodplains. Nonetheless, it
is an example both of Gilbert White at work and of state-of-the-art
river management.
E. Adopt Integrated Risk-Based Floodplain Management
Since 1908, the floodplain-management community has fully
embraced the idea that flood damages can at best be minimized, but

109. Flood Insurance Reform Priorities Act of 2010, H.R. 495, 111th Cong., 22 (2010),
reported that the program’s debt stood at $18.75 billion primarily because of 2005 hurricane
claims. See generally WILL HEYES & ANDREW FAHLUND, AM. RIVERS, WEATHERING THE
CHANGE: POLICY REFORMS THAT SAVE MONEY AND MAKE COMMUNITIES SAFER 5 (2011),
available at http://www.americanrivers.org/assets/pdfs/global-warming-docs/weathering-change/
weathering-change-full-report.pdf.
110. See National Flood Insurance Program Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 112-123, 126 Stat.
365 (2012).
111. Id. § 2(b)(2). Second homeowners whose property is destroyed or damaged by a
hurricane will no longer be eligible for subsidized rates.
112. Dennis P. Robinson, Regional Economic Impacts of the 2008 Cedar Rapids Flood
(May 17, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.cedar-rapids.org/city-news/
flood-recovery-progress/floodrecoveryplans/Documents/Regional%20Economic%20
Development%20Report%205.17.10.pdf.
113. Cedar Rapids River Corridor Redevelopment Plan, SASAKI ASSOCS., INC.,
http://www.sasaki.com/project/131/cedar-rapids-river-corridor-redevelopment-plan/ (last visited
Sept. 19, 2012).
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114

this embrace has yet to fully play out on the ground. The
assumption that flood damage could be satisfactorily controlled by a
combination of structural defense and preventing the construction of
vulnerable structures in floodplains proved too simplistic. This
assumption has been replaced by the concept of integrated flood-risk
management. The policy changes and the difficulties in implementing
them are reflected in the responses to the two major flooding events
in recent years. The first event was the 1993 Upper Mississippi Flood
and the second was Hurricane Katrina in 2005.
During the summer of 1993, heavy rains fell on already-wet soil
in the Upper Mississippi basin, causing twelve to sixteen billion
115
dollars in damages. Rainfall amounts ranged from 200 to 350% of
116
normal, and in some areas the floods exceeded 500-year-occurrence
117
estimates. The damage was widespread, especially for farms and
118
small river towns, but it extended to flooded basements in Chicago.
Large cities such as Kansas City and St. Louis escaped major
119
120
flooding, but there were levee failures in both places. A federal
task force led by Brigadier General Gerald E. Galloway was formed
to investigate the causes of the flood.
The resulting “Galloway Report” remains the most
comprehensive examination of flood policy produced by the federal
121
government, but its lessons have yet to be fully implemented. The
Report endorsed Gilbert White’s call for comprehensive, federal
flood management rather than the piecemeal, uncoordinated
122
management strategy that existed then and continues to this day. It
also endorsed the notion that flood management had to be done on a

114. See generally JAMES M. WRIGHT, ASS’N OF STATE FLOODPLAIN MANAGERS, THE
NATION’S RESPONSES TO FLOOD DISASTERS: A HISTORICAL ACCOUNT (Wendy L. Hessler
ed., 2000), available at http://www.floods.org/PDF/hist_fpm.pdf (providing a detailed account of
the evolution of the program and other flood control management initiatives).
115. INTERAGENCY FLOODPLAIN MGMT. REVIEW COMM., supra note 10, at 18.
116. Id. at 10.
117. Id. at 9.
118. Id. at 17.
119. Id. at 6.
120. Id. at 18.
121. For example, the 2012 extension of the National Flood Insurance Program illustrates
that inability of Congress to craft a new flood management program. See supra notes 109–10 .
122. INTERAGENCY FLOODPLAIN MGMT. REVIEW COMM., supra note 10, at 73 (quoting
GILBERT WHITE ET AL., ACTION AGENDA FOR MANAGING THE NATION’S FLOOD PLAINS 4–5
(1992)).
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123

watershed basis. The Report is especially notable for its exploration
of the role that undeveloped or restored riparian areas and wetlands
124
could play in floodwater retention.
Hurricane Katrina was the worst flood disaster since the 1927
Mississippi River Flood. The response to the disaster was paradoxical.
Federal taxpayers have re-armored New Orleans but also recognized
125
the limits of this strategy. Katrina’s storm surge damaged some 169
126
of the 350 miles of floodwalls and levees around New Orleans. The
United States Army Corps of Engineers and the National Research
Council both evaluated what went wrong, and both reached two
major conclusions. First, the system of levees and floodwalls in place
127
was not an integrated, coordinated, and well-maintained system.
Second, flood protection strategy in at-risk areas such as New Orleans
must be based on an integrated risk-based system that expressly
rejects the expectation that complete structural protection against all
128
hydrologic contingencies is possible.
III. THE FUTURE OF FLOOD POLICY
There is a widespread consensus that risk-based adjustment will
be the basis for future flood-protection strategy, and that such a
strategy is a crucial element of the transition from unsustainable to
129
sustainable urban development. White’s vision has been articulated
by the policy forum that honors him:
There is a stronger trend in 2050 toward higher-density
development, clustering, in-filling of urban areas, and planning for
green infrastructure. The full range of flooding events is taken into
account in planning, including low-probability, high-consequence
storms. Many no-build zones—such as deep coastal storm surge
zones, deep riverine floodplains, and other high-hazard or

123. Id. at 141.
124. Id. at 66–67.
125. Schwartz, supra note 9.
126. CHRISTINE F. ANDERSEN ET AL., HURRICANE KATRINA EXTERNAL REVIEW PANEL,
AM. SOC’Y OF CIVIL ENG’RS, THE NEW ORLEANS HURRICANE PROTECTION SYSTEM: WHAT
WENT WRONG AND WHY 25 (2007).
127. U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, BUILDING A STRONGER CORPS: A SNAPSHOT OF HOW
THE CORPS IS APPLYING LESSONS FROM KATRINA 8 (2009).
128. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE NEW ORLEANS HURRICANE PROTECTION SYSTEM:
ASSESSING PRE-KATRINA VULNERABILITY AND IMPROVING MITIGATION AND
PREPAREDNESS 4–5 (2009).
129. E.g., UNITED NATIONS HUMAN SETTLEMENTS PROGRAMME, PLANNING
SUSTAINABLE CITIES: GLOBAL REPORT ON HUMAN SETTLEMENTS 2009, at 5 (2009).
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environmentally sensitive areas—are in place, analogous to the
floodways and coastal barrier resources system units of the
twentieth century. These no-build areas are respected in order to
sustain the natural benefits they provide to society, including highquality water, appropriate habitat for fish, wildlife, and flora;
groundwater recharge; recreation; and open spaces, in addition to
flood damage abatement. Some communities have been relocated
130
in whole or in part.

The problem is that the United States has been unable to
translate the consensus among experts into a coherent policy. The
most striking aspect of United States flood policy is the growing gap
between, on the one hand, the increasing sophistication of flood and
hazard mapping and risk assessment and communication, and on the
other, the failure to incorporate these developments into law and
131
policy. We continue to rely on uncoordinated, structural defenses,
even as our understanding of the limits of that policy increases and we
continue to encourage floodplain development. The last part of the
article identifies three barriers to adopting a flood-control policy
centered on risk-based adjustment to flood hazards.
A. Lack of an Authoritative Vision
The United States lacks a coherent flood-control strategy that is
binding on the states. A vision alone cannot create a coherent floodmanagement strategy, but it can provide a standard that all
subordinate units of government must follow instead of the everyarea-for-itself approach that characterizes much of the current United
States flood-control practice. The European Union (EU) has
implemented such a strategy. In 2007, the EU adopted a Floods

130. GILBERT F. WHITE NAT’L FLOOD POLICY FORUM, FLOODPLAIN MANAGEMENT 2050,
at 13 (2007).
131. For over twenty years, water planners have been urged to plan at the watershed level.
The lesson is slowly being absorbed, but the broader scale often only comes about when
downstream or upstream interests oppose a project. The Fargo, North Dakota-Moorhead,
Minnesota metro area is a case in point. The area is subject to frequent and severe flooding
from the Red River, which flows north into Canada. In cooperation with the Corps, the towns
are developing a multi-stage $1.7 billion plan which includes a strategy to divert the River
around the towns when the River reaches a flood stage. F-M AREA DIVERSION,
http://www.fmdiversion.com/ (last visited Sept. 20, 2012). The original diversion has been
modified to provide upstream storage facilities to hold back water after downstream cities
complained that the diversion would shift the flood damage to them. Jonathan P. Scoll, Flood
Control on the Red River as a Complex Environmental Decision System, NAT. RESOURCES &
ENV’T, Winter 2012, at 24, 27 (2012) (providing a history of the project from the perspective of
a lawyer representing downstream communities).
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132

Directive, which integrates flood management into a previously
existing Water Framework Directive. EU directives are binding on
133
the member states. They describe general outcomes which must be
achieved in the member states through a combination of management
134
and new legislation. The Floods Directive requires that all member
states develop river-basin management plans to correct a deficiency
in the Water Framework Directive, which failed to include flood-risk
135
minimization as a management objective.
The Flood Directive proceeds from the premise that floods
cannot be totally prevented but that the major risks associated with
136
floods can be managed. To this end, all member states must identify
the portions of rivers within their boundaries with significant flood
risks, and then prepare flood-hazard maps that display the following
three flooding scenarios and the probable adverse consequences in
137
each scenario:
(a) floods with a low probability, or extreme event
scenarios;
(b) floods with a medium probability (likely return period
≥ 100 years);
138
(c) floods with a high probability, where appropriate.
The maps form the basis for risk-management plans, which
shall take into account relevant aspects such as costs and benefits,
flood extent and flood conveyance routes and areas which have the
potential to retain flood water, such as natural floodplains, the
environmental objectives of Article 4 of Directive 2000/60/EC [The

132. Directive 2007/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 Oct. 2007
on the Assessment and Management of Flood Risks, 2007 (L 288) 27.
133. E.g., Case C-147/07, Comm’n v. France, 2008 E.C.R. 1-0000 (finding that France failed
to meet water quality objectives of the Water Framework Directive).
134. See, e.g., Directive 2007/60/EC, supra note 132, at art. 4 (dictating that member states
shall assess flood risks on river basins, produce flood risk maps, and develop flood risk
management plans). CONSOLIDATED VERSION OF THE TREATY ON THE FUNCTIONING OF THE
EUROPEAN UNION, Official J. of the European Union C83/47 Art. 288 (2010) (Treaty of
Lisbon). See generally TREVOR C. HARTLEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
LAW: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE
th
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (7 ed. 2010).
135. See Directive 2007/60/EC, supra note 132, at art. 7.
136. Id. intro. (“Floods are natural phenomena which cannot be prevented. . . . It is feasible
and desirable to reduce the risk of adverse consequences, especially for human health and life,
the environment, cultural heritage, economic activity and infrastructure associated with
floods.”).
137. Id. arts. 4–6.
138. Id. art. 6(3).
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Water Framework Directive], soil and water management, spatial
planning, land use, nature conservation, navigation and port
infrastructure.
Flood risk management plans shall address all aspects of flood
risk management focusing on prevention, protection, preparedness,
including flood forecasts and early warning systems and taking into
account the characteristics of the particular river basin or sub-basin.
Flood risk management plans may also include the promotion of
sustainable land use practices, improvement of water retention as
well as the controlled flooding of certain areas in the case of a flood
139
event.

EU Directives face many implementation problems, but they can
140
lead to the development of new and useful science-based standards
141
and innovative national legislation.
B. No Coherent Disbursal of Federal Funds for Flood Control
The federal government has mostly stopped building large dams
but has not stopped the scattered distribution of funds. The federal
government now funds flood-control structures, but in an irrational
way. The construction of small dams, levees, and other defenses is
now the product of two factors: congressional politics and the
magnitude of a potential disaster. While this was always the case, the
previous constraints on pure pork-barrel politics have been loosened.
Congress can still open the federal treasury as it has done for New
142
Orleans after Hurricane Katrina, but, in general, it is funding only
small flood-control projects and often only those initiated by local
communities. This makes it virtually impossible to follow the precept

139. Id. art. 7(3).
140. The Water Framework Directive requires that pollution management decisions be
based on ecological effects rather than sole reliance on the standard parameters of pollution.
This has led to innovative monitoring and ecological assessment systems. Daniel Hering et al.,
The European Water Framework Directive at the Age of 10: A Critical Review of the
Achievements With Recommendations for the Future, 408 SCI. TOTAL ENV’T. 4007, 4008 (2010).
For a less sanguine conclusion, see Henrik Josefsson & Lasse Baaner, The Water Framework
Directive—A Directive for the Twenty-First Century?, 23 J. ENVTL. L. 463 (2011).
141. Scotland used the Floods Directive in 2009 to enact The Flood Risk Management Act,
“which deliberately focuses attention on the extent to which the reduction of flood risk might be
achieved through both structural and non-structural options . . . including the potential for
‘natural features’ in the landscape to help retain flood water.” Chris Spray, Tom Ball & Josselin
Rouillard, Bridging the Water Law, Policy, Science Interface: Flood Risk Management in
Scotland, 20 WATER L. 165, 171–72 (2009).
142. Over fifteen billion dollars have been spent to construct a new levee system. John
Schwartz, New Orleans Levees Nearly Ready, But Mistrusted, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 2010, at A1,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/24/us/24levee.html?_r=1.
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of the EU Floods Directives that floods must be managed at the river
basin or watershed scale. The primary federal agency responsible for
flood control, the United States Army Corps of Engineers, is not
143
authorized to prioritize the allocation of federal funds.
In 1974, Congress abandoned the practice of large-scale, basinlevel project financing exemplified by the 1936 and 1944 Flood
Control Acts in favor of episodic Water Resource Development Acts
144
(WRDAs).
WRDAs authorize all manner of water projects
proposed by individual members of Congress and filtered through the
House Committee on Transportation or the Senate Committee on
Environment and Public Works. The final legislation is an example of
145
the politics of resource redistribution. This fragmentation was
cemented in the 1986 WRDA, which imposed a variety of costsharing formulas for new projects, accepting the post–New Deal
146
argument that small projects were only of local importance.
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers has never had the
independent authority to propose and build projects; rather, it must
seek Congressional funding on a project-by-project basis. By contrast,
through the 1960s, the Corps and Congress worked more closely to
147
plan on larger scales than is the case today. Currently, WRDAs
dilute and fragment the Corps’ authority to initiate projects, both
within the Corps itself and between the Corps and Congress. They
also create a strong institutional bias against both planning and
constructing on a basin-wide scale and matching money to the
148
magnitude of flood risk and project benefits. WRDAs have also

143. NICOLE T. CARTER & H. STEVEN HUGHES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32064,
ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS WATER RESOURCE PROJECTS: AUTHORIZATION AND
APPROPRIATIONS 6 (2006).
144. The last WRDA was enacted in 2007. See Water Resources Development Act of 2007,
Pub. L. No. 110-114, 121 Stat. 1041. The 2007 WRDA was enacted over President George W.
Bush’s veto and authorizes over 900 Corps of Engineers projects. U.S. Resources Development
Act of 2007, HYDRO-LOGIC (Nov. 10, 2007), http://hydro-logic.blogspot.com/2007/11/us-waterresources-development-act-of.html.
145. One of the leading students of water project funding characterizes Congressional
funding as an example of the politics of the widespread geographical distribution of federal
largesse. HELEN INGRAM, WATER POLITICS: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE 38–39 (1990).
146. See Water Resources Development Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-662, § 103, 100 Stat.
4082, 4084–85.
147. See FERRELL, supra note 61, at 125 (describing the coordination between Congress,
states, and the Corps beginning in the 1930s).
148. CARTER & HUGHES, supra note 143, at 6.
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decreased the power of the Corps to use benefit–cost analysis to weed
out inefficient local projects.
The inclusion of a project in a WRDA does not ensure its
construction. It must also receive an appropriation. The
appropriations process is shared between the Corps, the Executive
149
(through the Office of Management and Budget), and Congress.
There is no benefit–cost screen for inclusion in a WRDA, but there is
150
for appropriations. However, WRDAs can dribble planning funds
to keep small projects alive. As the Congressional Research Service
has observed, “the appropriated funds for an individual study or
project . . . [may be] insufficient to permit the optimum programming
151
of work by the Corps.”
The focus on small projects, often kept alive for years as
individual representatives secure the authorization of small amounts
of planning money, means that real problems continue to worsen. For
example, many of the nation’s levees were not constructed to deal
with the 100-year flood, let alone the increased frequency and
152
magnitude of floods associated with climate change. In 2010, the
Association of State Floodplain Managers issued the following
warning concerning risks resulting from the deteriorating levees,
climate change, and federal budget priorities:
We will soon enter an era of levee ‘triage’—the process of
prioritizing federal response to flood risk associated with levees and
rationing scarce federal dollars on multiple-objective risk reduction
projects that may include floodplain restoration, reconfiguration of
structural systems, and combinations of systems that make the best
153
use of resources.

C. The Chilling Effect of Supreme Court Takings Jurisprudence
Supreme Court takings jurisprudence presents a major barrier to
incorporating risk and moral-hazard considerations into land-use
149. See NICOLE T. CARTER & CHARLES V. STERN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41243,
ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS WATER RESOURCE PROJECTS: AUTHORIZATION AND
APPROPRIATIONS 6 (2011).
150. Id. at 7.
151. CARTER & HUGHES, supra note 143, at 6.
152. For example, after an assessment of Dallas’ levees, the Corps withdrew its support for
FEMA certification of “a 100 year event.” U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, ENVIRONMENTAL
ASSESSMENT: 100-YEAR FLOOD EVENT REMEDIATION MEASURES DALLAS FLOODWAY
SYSTEM ES-2 (2011).
153. ASS’N OF STATE FLOODPLAIN MANAGERS, NATIONAL FLOOD RISK MANAGEMENT—
LEVEE SAFETY COMPONENT 1 (2010).
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decisions designed to limit floodplain development. Fairness is the
core norm inherent in the Fifth Amendment’s prohibitions against
154
the taking of property without due process. Fairness has two
dimensions: protecting landowners who are the victims of
discrimination and avoiding surprise. Discrimination occurs when a
single property owner (or a small group) is singled out to bear a
155
disproportionate burden. The easiest takings cases are usually equal
protection cases where the regulation comes too late to be effective.
Unfairness also occurs when a landowner is justifiably surprised
by a regulation. The Court incorporated the protection against
156
surprise into takings law in the 1978 Penn Central case. Penn
Central, which upheld a landmark designation, announced a balancing
test that implicitly narrowed the situations in which surprise could be
claimed by limiting compensation to cases where the government
157
interferes with “reasonable,”
“distinct investment-backed
158
expectations.”
Flood-control regulation squarely raises the question of whether
property owners who develop in a floodplain have any basis to claim
they have been unfairly discriminated against or surprised. In general,
the answer is no, although flood-control maps still underestimate risks
159
and communities have resisted adjusting them to climate change.
Much building in floodplains, at least today, can be characterized as
moral-hazard behavior. The problem is that the Court’s takings
154. Frank Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of Just Compensation Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1245 (1967) (“We tend
naturally to think of fairness as a standard against which to test political action, a discipline to be
administered specifically and with deliberation, an extrinsic constraint to be imposed on an
intrinsically nonfair political process.”).
155. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
156. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123–24 (1978). The Supreme
Court identified “[t]he economic impact of the regulation on the claimant, and, particularly, the
extent to which the investment has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations” are
the major relevant factors in deciding whether compensation is due. Id. at 124.
157. Justice Brennan was influenced by Professor Frank Michelman’s path-breaking article.
See Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 128 (citing Michelman, supra note 154). Professor Michelman
identified notice that a claimed property interest would not be recognized as a legitimate basis
to deny compensation, and Justice Brennan cited a leading example. See id. at 125 (citing
United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53 (1913) (holding the Federal
government’s paramount interest in the use of navigable waters imposes a servitude on such
waters and prevents the recognition of the private riparian against the federal government)).
158. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 127 (citing Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922)).
159. DAN HUBER, CTR. FOR CLIMATE & ENERGY SOLUTIONS, FIXING A BROKEN
NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM: RISKS AND POTENTIAL REFORMS 4 (2012),
available at http://www.c2es.org/docUploads/flood-insurance-brief.pdf.
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jurisprudence creates incentives for property owners to engage in
160
risky behavior. Thus, it performs the opposite of what the surprise
component of fairness is designed to do: compensate victims of
regulation who have suffered substantial and unanticipated losses in
the value of their property, which are disproportionate in comparison
161
to those suffered by similarly situated right holders.
Floodplain regulation has a long history, but takings law casts
doubts on its ability to deal with the expected severity and
geographical scope of floods. Early efforts to limit development in
floodplains were initially questioned because the primary purpose
162
was deemed paternalistic. Courts, however, upheld ordinances
163
limiting development in floodplains. An influential Connecticut
case involved a challenge to state Water Resources Commission
164
setback restrictions along a river that had recently flooded. A
riparian property owner whose buildings were destroyed by a flood
and could only use sixty square feet to rebuild challenged the
165
setbacks as a taking. The court held that the refusal to allow a new
cinder-block building on a concrete foundation was a “justifiable”
preventative measure in light of the loss of life and property caused
166
by the flood.
Floodplain regulation has become harder to sustain under the
Supreme Court’s post-1978 jurisprudence. Three major opinions
involve flood-control regulations, and the Court found a potential
160. The self-executing nature of the Fifth Amendment and the Court’s unwillingness to
accept environmental justifications for land use regulations, discussed infra, creates a substantial
incentive for land owners to challenge regulations as a taking. See Klien & Zellmer, supra note
32, at 1510–18 (describing the phenomenon as a “double take” because taxpayers subsidize bad
behavior through both paying for the construction of flood control structures and compensating
land owners for regulatory takings when building in floodplain areas is prohibited). If
communities allow risky behavior in flood plains, the government often subsidizes protection
through levees and insurance. Id. at 1510. If communities try to prevent the behavior,
“taxpayers may be forced to compensate disappointed developers.” Id.
161. See Joseph L. Sax, Land Use Regulation: Time to Think About Fairness, 50 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 455 (2010).
162. Allison Dunham, Flood Control Via the Police Power, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 1098, 1107
(1959).
163. E.g., Turner v. County of Del Norte, 101 Cal. Rptr. 93, 96 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972);
Turnpike Realty Co. v. Town of Dedham, 284 N.E.2d 891, 901 (Mass. 1972); Vartelas v. Water
Res. Comm’n, 153 A.2d 822, 826 (Conn. 1959).
164. Vartelas, 153 A.2d at 824–26.
165. Id. at 823.
166. Id. at 825–26 (noting that the plaintiff had failed to establish that an alternative
structure “would serve the plaintiff’s purposes and permit the economic utilization of the
property”).
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taking in each. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale
167
v. County of Los Angeles held that a church camp could claim a
temporary taking when Los Angeles County prevented it from
168
rebuilding after the camp was destroyed in a flash flood. The case
established for the first time that a court may award damages for a
taking in this context, but contained no discussion of the desirability
of preventing the land owner from engaging in behavior that is a
169
170
moral hazard. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council held that a
state setback regulation on barrier islands, designed to prevent houses
from crashing into each other in a hurricane, was a per se taking
171
because it deprived the land owner of all economic value of his land.
South Carolina argued that the setback regulation was well within its
police powers because the setbacks were designed to prevent a
landowner from engaging in a harmful use, as opposed to
unjustifiably and unfairly forcing her to confer a benefit on the
172
community. The distinction has been urged as a useful test to decide
when fairness demands compensation, but Justice Scalia dismissed
173
the distinction on the ground that it was incoherent. For Justice
Scalia, a regulation which denies a land owner all valuable
development options could only be justified if there was an inherent
174
limitation on the landowner’s title, and none was found in this case.
For all its questionable analysis, the much-parsed Lucas is a simple
equal-protection case; the state applied a setback to a barrier island
after development on all but plaintiff’s lots had occurred.
The third Supreme Court case to ignore the merits of flooddamage prevention involved a city’s approval of the expansion of
development on a riparian property, on the condition that the owner
dedicate a portion of the property in the floodplain for an improved
175
storm drainage system. Development exactions are usually imposed

167. 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
168. Id. at 307–08, 322.
169. See id. at 322. The Church never recovered damages because a California appellate
court held that the regulation was a valid health and safety regulation. First English Evangelical
Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 258 Cal. Rptr. 893 (Cal. Ct. App.
1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1056 (1990).
170. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
171. Id. at 1007–09, 1028–32.
172. Id. at 1022–1024.
173. Id. at 1026.
174. Id. at 1027.
175. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 377–82 (1994).
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176

to offset the external costs of a specific proposed development, and
the Supreme Court requires an “essential nexus” between the impact
of the development and the exaction and “rough proportionality”
177
between the exaction and the predicted consequence. The Court
had no trouble finding a nexus between preventing flood damage and
limiting development, but it imposed a very high burden on the city to
178
justify the exaction: “The city has never said why a public greenway,
as opposed to a private one, was required in the interest of flood
179
control.” The net result of these cases is that courts will still uphold
180
floodplain regulations but are open to takings challenges.
As more is known about flood risk, one could argue that
regulation can hardly come as a surprise to property owners.
However, the Court has been reluctant to allow governments to
provide notice to landowners through legislation that they should not
engage in moral-hazard behavior. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island seemed
to foreclose such legislative notice but nevertheless left a door open
to such notice. In that case, Rhode Island defended its refusal to allow
the landowner to fill a wetland on the grounds that forty years of
wetland regulation had put landowners on notice that it would be
181
difficult to obtain such permission. The Court dismissed the
argument that the purchaser of highly-regulated property assumes the
risk of development denial with the quip that “[t]he state may not put
182
so potent a Hobbesian stick into the Lockean bundle.” Locke
himself might be surprised that his labor theory now incorporates the
183
Roman law right of ius abutendi—the right to destroy property.
However, Justice O’Connor’s increasingly influential concurrence
opened the door to incorporating moral hazard into takings law. She
posited that the level of regulation was relevant to the property
owner’s reasonable investment-backed expectations, and thus the
176. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987).
177. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391.
178. Id. at 386–87.
179. Id. at 393.
180. See, e.g., April v. City of Broken Arrow, 775 P.2d 1347, 1348, 1355–56 (Okla. 1989).
181. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 614, 627 (2001).
182. Id. at 627. In her concurrence, Justice O’Connor argued that the property owner’s
knowledge of the extent of regulation was an element to be considered in determining the
compensation, if any, to which he was entitled under the interference with investment backedexpectations standard. Id. at 634–35 (O’Connor, J., concurring). On remand, the Rhode Island
trial court found that proposed fill would be a public nuisance. J.B. Ruhl, Making Nuisance
Ecological, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 753, 776 (2008).
183. See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to Destroy, 114 YALE L.J. 781, 787–89 (2005).
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184

level of reasonable compensation. Justice O’Connor’s analysis has
been adopted by the Federal Circuit in a variety of contexts to deny
185
compensation.
The case that came closest to incorporating moral hazard into
186
takings law is Casitas Municipal Water District v. United States. The
District had a state water right to apply 2,800 acre-feet of water per
year to beneficial use, but to comply with a National Marine Fisheries
Biological Opinion (BiOp), the District was required to construct a
fish ladder at the intersection of a dam and canal, and to divert
187
between 1,349 and 3,200 acre-feet per year to supply the ladder.
Reversing a lower court decision denying compensation, the Federal
Circuit Court of Appeals held that the regulation was a physical
188
taking and remanded for a calculation of damages.
On remand, the District invoked projected decreases in water
supply from climate change as a reason that the loss of water was a
189
taking. However, after a trial, the Court of Federal Claims found
that no damages had occurred and thus did not reach the District’s
190
climate change argument. The District argued that the biological
opinion had caused a permanent loss of 1,915 acre-feet, measured by
191
the annual reduction of the project’s safe yield. The court rejected
that damage measure because the measure of any water right is
192
beneficial use. Applying this standard, the court found that storage
184. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 634–35 (O’Connor, J., concurring). Compare Justice
O’Connor’s analysis with her plurality opinion in Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 522
(1998), in which she concluded that retroactive coal miner health care liability interfered with
investment-backed expectations of a company that went out of business.
185. See, e.g., Palmyra Pac. Seafoods, L.L.C. v. United States, 561 F.3d 1361, 1365–71 (Fed.
Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S.Ct. 2402 (2010) (refusing compensation for designation of tidal
lands on Palmyra Atol as wildlife refuge closed to commercial fishing); Appolo Fuels, Inc. v.
United States, 381 F.3d 1338, 1348–49 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (denying compensable taking in
designation of lands under Surface Mine Reclamation Act as unsuitable for coal mining); Rith
Energy, Inc. v. United States, 270 F.3d 1347, 1353–53 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (disavowing
compensation for revocation of mining permit).
186. 543 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2008). For an analysis of the decision see A. Dan Tarlock,
Takings, Water Rights, and Climate Change, 36 VERMONT L. REV. 731, 753–56 (2012).
187. Casitas, 543 F.3d at 1282.
188. Id. at 1296.
189. Plaintiff’s Post-Trial Brief, Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 102 Fed. Cl. 443
(2011) (No. 05-168L), ECF No. 213, asserts that the District has no surplus water and climate
change will aggravate its thin margin of safety. The assertion is based on the Expert Report of
Edward Aguado, Department of Geography, San Diego State University. Id.
190. Casitas, 102 Fed. Cl. at 472.
191. Id. at 465.
192. Id. at 470.
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allowed the District both to meet its delivery obligations and to
193
comply with the bypass requirements of the BiOp. Thus, the
District’s takings claim was not ripe because it had not suffered “an
194
actual reduction in beneficial use.” The court’s reaffirmation that a
water right is limited to water actually applied to beneficial use is an
important step in the incorporation of risk and moral hazard into
takings law. In explaining why there had not been an interference
with beneficial use, the court observed that the District continued to
add customers but, “ha[d] not changed how it allocates water to its
customers, has not purchased alternative water supplies, has not
instituted any mandatory conservation measures or changed its
drought contingency measures, and has not increased the price of
195
water due to the biological opinion.”
The facts of Casitas do not present a classic moral-hazard
problem. There was a forty-year lag between the time that the
District signed a contract with the Bureau of Reclamation to obtain
water from the Ventura River Project and the time that it was asked
196
to construct a fish ladder to protect listed endangered species.
Nonetheless, the court explicitly suggested that the beneficial-use
doctrine may require a water-right holder to take affirmative steps to
avoid a loss caused by the need to adapt to changed conditions—an
197
implicit moral-hazard analysis. It sanctioned the water-right holder
for engaging in moral-hazard behavior by failing to take action that
would have avoided the loss.
IV. CONCLUSION
There is a firm consensus among students of flood control policy
that the future of flood-management policies must adopt riskmanagement strategies that mix structural protections with more
aggressive land-use and building regulations. There are a great deal of
innovative flood protection and management initiatives taking place
around the United States, and technological advances in hazard
mapping now allow risk managers to display climate range risks at
fine scales. However, it will not be easy to translate this consensus
into policy on the ground. Three reasons stand out. First, flood
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

Id. at 461–62.
Id. at 474.
Id. at 470.
Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 543 F.2d 1276, 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
Casitas, 102 Fed. Cl. at 454.

Tarlock 12.17 (Do Not Delete)

Fall 2012]

12/17/2012 2:27 PM

U.S. FLOOD CONTROL POLICY

183

control is slowly being devolved to local and regional bodies. The lack
of federal money and guidance means that the potential for
communities to shift flood risks to upstream or downstream
communities remains high. Second, too often the Federal Flood
Insurance Program, and the land-use regulations enacted to comply
198
with it, function to allow too much development in at-risk areas.
Third, the seemingly deep and entrenched denial of climate change in
199
the United States makes it very difficult for many areas to adjust
flood maps to incorporate realistic climate change scenarios, as they
must. Thus, in contrast to Europe, the United States has de facto
adopted a reactive flood control policy, pursuant to which we are
likely to wait for flood disasters and then construct new protection
structures while along the way engaging in modest attempts at natural
flood retardation and floodplain retreat. Time will tell if this strategy
will be adequate to deal with a changing climate and a growing
200
population that loves to be near water.

198. “Even without climate change, these [FEMA-required] maps create incentives to
locate in areas of high risk, because flood insurance is only required within areas with at least a
one percent chance of serious flooding in any given year.” ELLEN HANAK & JAY LUND,
ADAPTING CALIFORNIA’S WATER MANAGEMENT TO CLIMATE CHANGE 22–23 (2008),
available at http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/report/r_1108jlr.pdf.
199. It is difficult to measure climate change attitudes. A 2012 University of Texas poll
taken during the 2012 drought in the center of the country found that 70% of persons surveyed
believe that climate change is occurring. Dorsi Diaz, 70 Percent of People in U.S. Now Believe in
Climate Change, EXAMINER (July 20, 2012), http://www.examiner.com/article/70-percent-ofpeople-u-s-now-believe-climate-change. However, a poll of Iowa farmers found that while 68%
percent of those surveyed believe that climate change is occurring, only 10% of the 68%
attribute it to human causes. Gregory Meyer, Climate Skepticism Drenches Drought-Hit US
Corn Belt, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2012, at 3.
200. The current United States population is 313 million and projections vary from 323 to
458 million as the Bureau of Census explains. “The U.S. population is projected to increase over
the next four decades in all of the projection series. The size of the increase in each series is
dependent on the level of net international migration.” JENNIFER M. ORTMAN & CHRISTINE E.
GUARNERI, UNITED STATES POPULATION PROJECTIONS: 2000 TO 2050, at 2 (2009), available at
http://www.census.gov/population/www/projections/analytical-document09.pdf.

